Just Try It by Radul, Judy
Just Try It 
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Judy Radul 
"If the audience co-operates, they become either actors or materials. To 
impede interruptions during the action, the handling will be similar to that 
of a gym lesson." 
-0tto Muehl, 1965' 
As artists and critics in the contemporary zone have struggled to charac- 
terize the shocking diversity of activities understood as art, a host of 
metaphors emerge to describe artistic practice. Leo Steinberg addressed 
this tendency in his wittily argued 1968 critique of formalism, in which he 
speculates that the language of Greenbergian rhetoric is as influenced by 
the "streamlined efficiency image"2 of the Detroit auto industry as by an 
ideal of Kantian self-critique. For Steinberg, this tendency toward annex- 
ing other models and using other criteria to judge art is a phenomenon 
with a long history. America, in Steinberg's estimation, deeply distrusts 
art and tends to see it as effete and European. He states, "The process of 
courting non-art is continuous. Not art but happenings; not art but social 
action; not art but transaction-or situation, experiment, behaviour stim- 
ulus.. . . American artists seek to immerse the things they make or do in 
the redeeming otherness of non-art. Hence the instability of the modern 
e~perience."~ 
One can also view this continuous reframing of art activity as art's 
refusal of essentialism and a way in which metaphors counter to domi- 
nant ideologies arise. In contrast to all the action-oriented scenarios out- 
lined by Steinberg, Duchamp's evocation of chess and leisure can be 
recalled. In addition, conceptual artists conceived of art as (post) philoso- 
phy and the semiotic tendencies of the seventies and eighties promoted 
writing and reading as analogues to art-making and viewing. Models con- 
tinue to be added to the list and compete for currency. 
The metaphor that informs this conference is the idea of art as experi- 
ment. This paper takes up that metaphor without directly hypothesizing 
about what experimentalism is; rather, I try to weave together ideas of 
experiment that are already in play to provoke some questions about the 
relation of art and science experiment. 
It could very rightly be said that there is little crossover between the 
"experiment," which artists refer to as part of their practice, and what is 
carried out under that name in science. In fact, during the course of the 
Blowing the Trumpets conference, the term "experimental" was used as a 
synonym-albeit often with discomfort-for a variety of other terms, 
including, primarily, "avant-garde," but without any explicit reference to 
science practice. In the filmlvideo lexicon the term is a catch-all that refers 
to a variety of techniques, strategies, and instances of production and dis- 
course with a history of "experimental film" written over the last fifty- 
odd years. Primarily these "experiments" are experimental in relation to 
the hegemonic presence of Hollywood and its attendant ideologies. Here 
the term experimental is really used to valorize "different" or "anti-hege- 
monic" practices. This use of the term allows for relational comparisons 
between experimental and non-experimental practice but isn't so specific 
about what "experiment" is. Even in a text such as Marga Bijvoet's Art 
as Inquiry: Toward New Collaborations Between Art, Science and Tech- 
nology, which takes the relation between art and science as its topic, the 
term is occasionally used quite loosely. For instance: "When Woody and 
Steina arrived in New York City, inter-media art was at its height. Diving 
into an active New York art scene, they found themselves attracted to the 
experimental side, to artists working in the  margin^."^ 
I'm wary of science-flavoured metaphors, as they are likely the outcome 
of the widespread cultural illegitimacy of art work vs. science work. 
Artists in academic positions experience this friction as they are called 
upon to describe their artwork as "research" and conform to a social sci- 
ence paradigm in order to gain funding. Art and science as fields of com- 
plementary human endeavour are intertwined throughout history. 
However, the risk of facile comparison looms large (i.e., artists talk about 
carrying out "experiments" or working in a "media lab," but one gets the 
sense that even the artists themselves aren't wholly convinced by these 
metaphors). 
See If It Works 
In the visual arts the term experimental, though familiar, doesn't locate a 
coherent body of work or discourse (as it does in avant-garde film and 
video circles). The term is associated with the break-up of modernism in 
the '60s and the increased valuation of process, idea, action, structure, 
situation, and performance over the discrete, "autonomous" art object 
that was characteristic of the period. This focus on process over object is 
consistent with American philosopher Robert P. Crease's idea of the 
experiments (scientific or artistic) as exhibiting a "detached attitude" 
toward results. This detachment is an aspect which runs through twentieth- 
century art. It is manifest as art's refusal of instrumentality but also as a 
result of critiques on the basis of social and linguistic construction of the 
subject and of representation which dismanteled assumptions about the 
role of intentionality in art making. Combined with the increasing 
inclination to understand the context as part of the work, this tendency 
makes possible a comparison between scientific and artistic "experiment." 
What is striking about the work of Crease is that, rather than an interest 
in describing ar t  as a kind of science experiment, he employs an art 
metaphor to question the nature of scientific experiment. He devotes his 
entire 1993 book The Play of Nature to extending this analogy. Specifi- 
cally, he pursues the analogy of experiment as theatrical performance. 
Robert Crease describes "experiment" in an open manner that would 
surely be adequate for much artistic practice: 
Scientific experiments are unique events in the world undertaken for the 
purpose of allowing something to be seen. What comes to be seen is not 
something unique and peculiar to that event, but something that can also 
be seen in similar performances in other contexts.. . . Scientific perfor- 
mances are addressed to specific communities and are responses to issues 
raised within those communities. But properly preparing and viewing the 
performances requires a detached attitude, one interested in seeing what is 
happening for its own sake rather than for some practical end. The out- 
comes of the detached seeing of such performances, however, can be a 
deepened and enriched understanding of the world and our engagement 
with it.6 
This description echoes the peculiar conditions of contemporary art-mak- 
ing. The artist is committed yet uncertain of the outcome-ultimately the 
artist commits to the uncertainty of the practice that is art. One wonders 
if experiment can be avoided in art. Even if the artist proceeds with a 
clear intentionality, reckoning with the work on the part of the audience 
cannot be fully predicted. Even Jeff Wall, an artist well known for 
attempting cohesion and control of meaning, accepts that "viewers of 
works [of art] cannot be marshaled into seeing the work in any specified 
way."' But this unpredictability alone is but one aspect of the experimen- 
tal. Below 1'11 follow up a few other points of contiguity between art and 
scientific experimentation that arise from Crease's description-the ideas 
of detachment from results and need for an informed audience. Later I 
pick up on ideas about "appearance" and the conception of the experi- 
ment as a response to "issues raised." 
Semi-Detached 
Reality television makes a grotesque out of the curiosity and openness 
with which artists create(d) experimental situations, such as Les Levine's 
real-time video exploration of his loft (Space Walk, 1969) or Marina 
Abramovic's early piece in which she remained passive for six hours while 
the audience chose from a table of dangerous instruments they could 
"use" on her (Rhythm 0, 1974). This negative aspect of the experimental 
is evoked by Baudrillard who states, "Our reality has become experimen- 
tal. Without destiny, modern man is left with an endless experimentation 
of himself."* Even if we take issue with Baudrillard's ideas about destiny 
we might still recognize something compelling in his example of the real- 
ity TV show The Loft as the kind of experiment that he further charac- 
terizes as introducing "principles of scientific evidence and verification ... 
[elverywhere the experimental takes over the real and the imaginar~."~ 
These remarks remind us that, in particular, the detachment that is neces- 
sary to experiment can also promote a banal and ultimately sadistic atti- 
tude toward the object. In Baudrillard's account of experiment there is an 
inability to empathize with the subject of the experiment who is "itself" 
no longer real. He describes the intrusive-yet endless-specularity of 
reality television as a desire to see everything while, at the same time, not 
caring about anything. 
No Audience 
The need for a specific and prepared audience for experiment is some- 
thing that Crease emphasizes (above) and Joseph Kosuth echoes in his 
1970 statement that "the audience of conceptual art is composed primar- 
ily of artists-which is to say that an audience separate from the partici- 
pants doesn't exist. In a sense then art becomes as 'serious' as science or 
philosophy, which don't have 'audiences' either."'O Jeff Wall identifies 
genre as that which determines that artwork is "addressed to specific 
communities" who are "properly prepared."'l 
Experiment as Tradition? 
For Wall, genre is an important aspect of tradition that assists the work's 
readability. He claims, 
The process of experience of a work, while it must be open to the associa- 
tions brought to it by different people, is still structured and regulated and 
contains determinations. I think it is controlled, above all, by genre, by the 
generic character of the picture-types and the types of subject. Bakhtin said 
that genre was the collective, accumulated meaning of things that has 
come through time and the mutations of social orders. It is the foundation 
of the guarantee of objectivity, the basis of the "truth content" of represen- 
tations.. . .l2 
This inclusion of tradition, genre, or "something that can also be seen in 
similar performances in other contexts" as a guarantor of an experiment's 
readability indicates that if an experiment is entirely saturated with nov- 
elty it risks non-recognition. 
Counting on Analysis 
While not pretending to be an historical survey of the idea of the experi- 
mental, my mentioning of Kosuth allows me to introduce a complex of 
ideas surrounding modernism's aspirations to science. In Kosuth's ener- 
getic and self-consciously paradigm-shifting Art after Philosophy (1968) 
he outlines an analytical program for art in which each work is a proposi- 
tion that is primarily concerned with developing the definition of art: "In 
other words, the propositions of art are not factual, but linguistic in char- 
acter ... they express definitions of art, or the formal consequences of defi- 
nitions of art."13 He asserts the cleanly tautological state of art as follows: 
Art's unique character is the capacity to remain aloof from philosophical 
judgements. It is in this context that art shares similarities with logic, 
mathematics and, as well, science. But whereas the other endeavors are 
useful, art is not. Art indeed exists for its own sake.t4 
Early conceptual work sought to assimilate an idea of science as rigorous 
meaning-making through the application of non-subjective analysis and 
controlled systematic approaches to art-making. Later, in the 1975 essay 
"The Artist as Anthropologist," Kosuth reassesses Art After Philosophy as 
having "externalized features of the art activity which had always been 
internalized-making them explicit and capable of being examined."ls But 
he concedes that his earlier essay perpetuated the scientism of mod- 
ernism.16 
The experimental, such as Carolee Schneemann's drawing performance 
Up To And Including Her Limits (1976), with its emphasis on process 
and context, is in contradistinction to Kosuth's early notion of science as 
an elegantly hermetic field. Experimentation by artists articulates the fine 
line between detachment (as liberation) and claims of objectivity (as 
alienation). Art experimentalism resists the necessity of a unified "idea" 
as a validating principle. Coherence is provided by the examination of a 
network or context such as in the work of Mark Dion, who replicates the 
fieldwork model of natural science by bringing specimens into the gallery 
and using art to frame the entirety of his activities, including collection, 
display, and the ecological ramifications of natural science. 
Art's use of "scientific experiment" opened the model to interpretation 
and produced not only essentialisms but also jokes and parodies. For 
instance, in the conceptual works of Douglas Huebler, a work may begin 
with a formal experiment as a catalyst, but once set in motion the strictures 
of method are purposely undermined. In a work such as Variable Piece #70 
(In Process), Global, this statement of purpose accompanies the pho- 
tographs: "Throughout the artist's lifetime he will photographically docu- 
ment, to the extent of his capacity, the existence of everyone alive in order 
to produce the most authentic and inclusive representation of the human 
species that may be assembled in that manner."17 Here Huebler expresses 
both sympathy and skepticism toward grandiose data-gathering. 
Experiment as Trying Doing 
If we think of the experimental in art as valorizing the act of "trying" 
rather than testing we may recognize a relationship with the concept of 
action. Historicized by thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, "action" has a 
particular relation to manifesting one's self as an  individual and historical 
subject.18 The same belief is reflected even in Baudrillard's statements that 
in the modern world this ability to act is vastly diminished, replaced by a 
society of passive-aggressive watchers who do surveillance on each other's 
"behaviour." As a response to  a world of seemingly incomprehensible 
complexity, the assertion that  "it can't hurt to try" (i.e., t o  "blow the 
trumpet to the tulips") is both abject and alienated and open and opti- 
mistic. Artists try actions that are too stupid (in the best and most com- 
plex sense of the word) for science to  contemplate. Experiment, the 
rebuilding of the world to see what the world is like, is laborious. Inclined 
to be skeptical about statements of truth, the experimental re-musters the 
elements. The artist, perhaps here exemplified by those making installa- 
tions, leaps into the hermeneutic circle19 from a particular place. Through 
elaborate preparations of space and material~,~O the artist tries to produce 
the atmosphere that is conducive to a change, and hopes his or her inter- 
ventions will be generative. Yet Arendt is clear, even if one doesn't know 
what one is trying, trying is a kind of doing,21 trying zs beginning and 
beginning sets things in motion. And for better or worse, "action has no 
end."22 Perhaps it is the different consequences of trying that distinguish 
art  and science. When science behaves for its own sake, simply trying 
things out, with a devotion to the process and little regard for the conse- 
quences, terrible things can happen. Arendt writes: 
Through the introduction of the experiment, in which we prescribed man- 
thought conditions to natural processes and forced them to fall into man- 
made patterns, we eventually learned how to "repeat the process that goes 
on in the sun; that is, how to win from natural processes on the earth 
those energies which without us develop only in the universe. 
The very fact that natural sciences have become exclusively sciences of 
process and, in their last stage, sciences of potentially irreversible, irremediable 
"processes of no return" is a clear indication that, whatever the brain power 
necessary to start them, the actual underlying human capacity which alone 
could bring about this development is no "theoretical" capacity, neither con- 
templation nor reason, but the human ability to act-to start new unprece- 
dented processes whose outcome remains uncertain and unpredictable 
whether they are let loose in the human or the natural realm.23 
It is only perversion to  think that  a r t  is less important  than science 
because its consequences are less dire. Perhaps art  is the milieu for trying. 
Thinking and Tinkering 
It is important to  note, however, that the experimental and the scientific 
attitude should not be unproblematically equated. It is Crease's thesis that 
the experimental has been vastly undervalued in comparison t o  theory- 
making when conceptualizing the project of science. Crease argues that 
the idea of experiment can be called upon t o  counter "mythic" 
approaches t o  science. Mythic approaches all preserve a "division of labor 
present in modern science between experimenters and theorists"24 and 
perpetuate the idea that 
... science is essentially theory making. Theories in this view are representa- 
tions of the nature and behavior of a set of fundamental things that are 
"out there" in the world: true theories are accurate representations .... in 
all three versions [of the mythic account] the basic content of science is 
removed from sense perception; the Democritean by the assumption that 
the fundamental entities are too small to be perceptible; the Platonic by the 
assumption that the fundamental entities are akin to ideal forms, numbers, 
or mathematical objects; and the Kantian by the assumption that the fun- 
damental entities are unknowable things-in-themselves that are revealed in 
human experience only via the mediation of a synthetic activity that 
simultaneously puts them behind an impassable barrier. In representing the 
nature and behavior of fundamental things or their effects, theories explain 
observations-what we perceive-of the world. The truths aimed at by 
theoretical representations are held to be eternal, above human time and 
history. Experimental methods and practices, which are historically and 
culturally bound, play no constitutive role in them.25 
It would seem then that the artist-experimenters of the twentieth-century 
avant-garde have similarly tried to use the idea of experimentation (per- 
haps in advance of science in this) to  dismantle some of the same mythic, 
metaphysical presumptions, and to  situate art  as an activity that is histor- 
ically and culturally bound rather than a timeless manifestation of genius 
or beauty. In fact, artists have seized on a central aspect of modern life- 
the idea of the "self" as an experimental unit for "testing" theories 
instead of receiving traditional knowledge without question. Artists often 
place themselves in the double role of the detached experimenter and the 
object of the inquiry, thereby explicitly contravening notions of scientific 
objectivity. To take but one example, consider the falling pieces of Bas Jan 
Ader "remake" Galileo. The "resistance" that the artist is subject totof- 
as he falls from a roof, into a canal, from a tree, or simply (and with most 
difficulty) from standing-is not only gravity and surface resistance, but 
also consciousness itself. Artist-experimenters who use their own body as 
a site of information seem to both affirm and trouble the place of experi- 
ence in modern life. To shoot myself in the arm as a mode of inquiry 
(Chris Burden) or to hang suspended from my flesh above the city (Ste- 
larc) is to provolte the authoritative limits of both art and experience. 
What can be "gained" from these acts? What can be said, even after such 
limit-testing experiences? The questionable knowledgetauthority achieved 
even through these extreme gestures anticipates experience's atrophied 
jurisdiction in the digital age. 
Come Over to My House 
One extreme example of artistic social experiment is the communal living 
pursued by Vienesse Actionist artist Otto Muehl as documented in Theo 
Alternberg's "Das Paradies Experiment." The banal sadism that Bau- 
drillard locates in reality television is preceded by slowly devolving 
utopian experiments such as M ~ e h l ' s . ~ ~  Existing in various forms over a 
twenty-year period, Muehl's group was a living experiment in the critique 
of societal norms (monogamy, work, cleanliness, private property, hierar- 
chy). The evening performances or "self presentations" were a constant 
feature of communal life and were used to  perpetuate the raw edge of 
existence as well as to act as a forum for retinscribing identity and social 
hierarchy. Crease has a more theatrical model in mind, but what he accen- 
tuates is a link between performance and experiment. To succeed they 
both need to be contextually responsive: 
...p erformance cannot be thought of in terms of its product alone; perfor- 
mances must be prepared by an advance set of behaviors and decisions.. . . 
A spectrum of decisions and activities have to take place before that open- 
ing night in order to "shape" that opening night performance.. . . If these 
decisions and activities were made differently, the outcome would differ as 
It's hard to imagine points of comparison between Muehl's amorphous- 
eroticized-infantilized art-life-demagogy experiment and the work of Jeff 
Wall. But the elasticity of the term experimental is illustrated by the fact 
that Wall also describes his work as "experimental": "I ... don't think that 
my pictures have any point of contact with the neo-conservative return to 
tradition, which counterposes figuration and representation against Mod- 
ernism and experimentalism. My work comes out of the process of exper- 
imental critique, but is itself an experimental critique of aspects of that 
process."28 Here modernism and experimentalism are aligned against con- 
servative reaction. Influenced early on by artists such as Vancouver's N.E. 
Thing Co. and American "land art" pioneer Robert Smithson, who ques- 
tioned the institutional frameworks of art as well as the nature of the art 
object, Wall defends his development "away" from these experiments as a 
double turn, an "experimental critique" of experiment. Wall understands 
modernism as experimental in that it has inherited the notion of self-regu- 
lating criticality from the Enlightenment. I wonder about the difference 
then between self-experiment and self-critique. Is there a possibility of 
non-dialectic experiment, one which is not searching for contradictions 
within an idea but is somehow experimentally thinking through difference? 
Experiment and Experience 
How to function well without destiny, God, and grand theory is now a 
familiar question. One difficulty is our (in)ability to create meaning from 
our experiences without naively reasserting a unified subject -that is, 
without re-erecting a false cohesion of the "I" how does one say "I saw 
this."29 This status of experience is something that Walter Benjamin 
addresses in "The Storyteller" (1936), Giorgio Agamben takes up in 
"Infancy and History" (1977), and which feminist writers have ques- 
tioned in terms of the exclusion of women's experience from history and 
symbolic meaning. 
I mention the questionable status of experience because in the experi- 
mental there is often a desire for, or assumption of, real experiences. 
What is available is understood as categorically not a representation but 
an appearance of phenomenon in the "here and now" shared by per- 
former/director/audience. Anxiety about appearance as "representation" 
is recognized by Crease, but he counters Plato's ancient prejudice against 
the theatre as merely mimetic by stating, "for theatre (like experimenta- 
tion) is in my terms ...p resentative rather than representative and confir- 
matory, revelatory and disclosive rather than i m i t a t i ~ e . " ~ ~  This resonates 
with Artaud's ambitions for theatre and, in fact, in his discussion of 
Artaud's "theatre of cruelty" Derrida similarly presents an idea of theatre 
as non-imitative (as life itself): "The theatre of cruelty is not a representa- 
tion. It is life itself, in the extent to which life is unrepresentable. Life is 
the nonrepresentable origin of repre~entation."~~ And later, "...non-repre- 
sentation is thus original representation if representation signifies also the 
unfolding of a volume, a multidimensional milieu, an experience which 
produces its own space ... A closed space that is to say a space produced 
from within itself and no longer organized from the vantage of another 
absent site.. . ."32 Artaudian staging is the fantastic convergence of as 
many life elements as possible. It is experiment because the complete 
remounting of history is no  longer organized from outside but partici- 
pated in, experienced. 
Crease's project-to provoke science with the unfixity of performance 
-produces an interesting category of experimental activity that he calls 
"artistic." He  contrasts "artistic" to "failed," "mechanical," and "stan- 
dardized" works. His conception of the artistic as something that "has 
not previously appeared" seems to shade it a little closer to Derrida's idea 
of "non representable origin of representation." As Crease writes, 
Artistic performance ... coaxes into being something which has not previ- 
ously appeared. It is beyond the standardized program; it is action at the 
limit of the already controlled and understood; it is risk. The artistry of 
experimentation involves bringing a phenomenon into material presence in 
a way which requires more than passive forms of preparation, yet in a way 
so that one nevertheless has confidence that one recognizes the phenome- 
non for what it is. Artistic objects "impose" themselves-they announce 
their presence as being completely or incompletely realized-but this impo- 
sition is not independent of the judgments and actions of the artist.j3 
However, Derrida's insistence via Artaud that "it is chance that is infinite, 
not God" and that "[tlhis play of life is artistic" goes much further than 
Crease to completely dismantle the experiment as well as the "usually" 
excluded preparations (the individuals, the space, the tools) that are used 
as a frame. While Crease emphasizes appearance over boundless experi- 
ence, Derrida describes an  exalted but elusive "experience which pro- 
duces its own space" and considers life rather than experimentation to be 
artistic. 
Crease remarks briefly on the relation between his ideas of the experi- 
ment as an  experience and Artaud's theatre of cruelty as anti-mimetic 
when he mentions "the prejudice in favor of representation over presenta- 
t i ~ n " ~ ~  in both science and theatre. Crease claims that  "by using the 
schema of hermeneutical phenomenology one is not forced into the posi- 
tion of having to choose between presentation or representation; both are 
accommodated within one framework."35 By hermeneutical phenomenol- 
ogy he means an interpretive investigation into phenomena and experi- 
ence in the context of daily life, one that recognizes no objective vantage 
point but a circle of affecting involvement continuously altering the object 
of inquiry. 
Trying Not  To  Try 
Can one experiment without or against structure, without "goals," for 
and against experiment? Crease is clear that experiment is the most open 
of processes; this is what differentiates it from "rehearsing, calibrating or  
demonstrating": 
One does not know precisely what will occur if one is truly performing 
rather than rehearsing, calibrating, or demonstrating; there is an aura of 
expectancy and suspense when a good performer takes the stage, even at 
the end of a run. We may also express this by saying that the act is exe- 
cuted in response to an inquiry, taken in its broadest sense as that "vague 
fever" that Merleau-Ponty asserts is prior to the act of artistic expression, 
a fever that cannot be assuaged with the aid of books, theories, and the 
like, but only from what transpires in the interplay of the performance ele- 
ments: "[Olnly the work itself, completed and understood, is proof that 
there was something rather than nothing to be said. Only the experiment 
itself, completed and understood, is proof that there was something rather 
than nothing to be discovered."36 
How do we experiment with our earnest desire to get results that justify 
the experiment? Even in the description above there is a causality, how- 
ever poetic, which emphasizes production initiated by a problematic situ- 
ation-a vague fever. Thinking about the problem produces theories or  
"texts" that  need realization.37 Science's need for a phenomenon38 to  
appear as a motivating force of the "performance" is almost the reverse 
of my own experience of causality in making art. Problems are not so eas- 
ily approached in art; if they are, one may quite quickly find that one is 
no  longer making art. To hold on to "art" while addressing gender, urban 
experience, or cultural specificity ( to name a few recent topics) one needs 
to consider the possibility that arises from an interplay of elements inside 
the space of art. What seems to matter are not experiments on the stuff of 
the world but rehearsing a way  of making decisions in relation to  mater- 
ial, context, history (not that they can be separated). Art cannot "test" 
anything. That is, it is not the material but the process with the material 
that is tested. What is ultimately of greatest interest to me as an artist is 
the decision-making process, its variability, its texture. This could also be 
described as the orientation and organization of differences. The attitude 
of the decision-making (which is reflected in the work) is what I under- 
stand as an aesthetic. Bruce Nauman says, "Art is a means of acquiring an 
investigative attitude."39 I understand this to mean not that art is an investiga- 
tive attitude (a platitude) but rather that art is a way toward such an attitude. 
This inquiring interpretive attitude, then, is "produced" by the experiment 
and is as significant as the artwork that is the more obvious result. 
The experiment, if it continues to be a meaningful description (and it is 
being used quite frequently, perhaps as the word "postmodern" pales), needs 
to be conceived of not just as process-oriented midwifery, but also as a zone of 
reception. That is, how does the experimental account for its appearance? My 
speech occurs at the invitation of your silence; the experiment is a condition 
that invites phenomena to appear. Is there a reciprocal situation where the 
phenomena also invite the experimental to appear? How can this circular 
causality be reckoned? Can it go beyond the circle, to the layered, multi- 
tracked mix of contemporary complexity? What conditions allow the experi- 
ment? By whom? When? Is the experiment only successful when Jesus, the 
phallus, or the like appear? Or, at least in art, can there be energizing flops 
and disappearances? Could something as rigidly symbolic as Mathew Barney's 
Cremaster 3 be considered an experiment? As a film it is by nature "closed" 
to its immediate context; it cannot respond, but as an action it enters the 
interrelated conditions that form the world of contemporary art, and by its 
very scale and ambition may cause other "phenomena" to appear. 
Making a Rabbit 
In postcoloniality we are incessantly offered counter-models through which the 
displaced-those placed on the margins of the enjoyment of full global partici- 
pation-fashion new worlds by producing experimental culture. By experimen- 
tal cultures I wish to define a set of practices whereby cultures evolving out of 
imperialism and colonialism, slavery and indenture, compose a collage of real- 
ity from the fragments of collapsing 
I observe that privilege-understood as not just economic or social advantage, 
but as "making sense in one's place and time"-produces not just better con- 
ditions for thinking-that is, more time, better equipment, access to better 
education, etc.-but a mind that is organized in a way that makes sense of and 
t o  the dominant culture. This making sense in relation to gender, family, com- 
munity, history, becomes the very believability of that person or "subject posi- 
tion." And one's credibility, believability to oneself as well as others, is a 
ground from which further sense-making activities rather naturally arise. If an 
experimental subject then can be imagined it would seem that experiments on 
the order of disappearance of self-phenomena (that which makes us believably 
the one we are, showing up under different profiles but remaining essentially 
recognizable) might be conducted. What about experiments in non-mani- 
festation, disappearance rather than appearance, their relation to magic 
and the destabilizing effect on the "witnesses" who are no longer sure of 
what they (didn't) see? The pleasurable experience of non-mastery is an 
essential element. Somehow, like Crease's anti-mythic science, I want to 
avoid the metaphors of discovery-the assumption that one is going 
"deeper" into an already available reality-that seem to permeate not only 
the analytic, but also the experimental. Although the links between an 
idea of experiment in science and in art may be tenuous or unexplored, 
the imagining of a continuum is worthwhile if only to conceptualize art 
experiments as a provocation, antidote, or tease to the formalism, author- 
ity, arrogance of science, and, one would hope, vice versa. To offer a chal- 
lenge each to the other from the side of life, cruelty, and materiality, and 
to practise to produce different forms of truth from the same experiment. 
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